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We prove that in almost all large tournaments, the minimal cov-
ering set is the entire set of alternatives. That is, as the number of
alternatives gets large, the probability that the minimal covering set
of a uniformly chosen random tournament is the entire set of alter-
natives goes to one. By contrast, it follows from a result of Fisher
and Reeves (1995) that the bipartisan set contains about half of the
alternatives in almost all large tournaments.
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1 Introduction
Tournaments have long played an important role in social choice theory as
a means of representing and understanding majority voting. A healthy lit-
erature has developed that is centered on defining and describing various
tournament solutions, which are meant to mathematically identify which al-
ternatives are “best” in any given tournament.1 These tournament solutions
include the top cycle set (Schwartz, 1972; Miller, 1977), the uncovered set
(Miller, 1980), the Banks set (Banks, 1985), the minimal covering set (Dutta,
1988), the bipartisan set (Laffond et al., 1993), the tournament equilibrium
set (Schwartz, 1990), and others.
A central principle in the search for new tournament solutions is that
“smaller is better.” That is, tournament solutions that select small sets
of “best” alternatives are preferred to those that are not as discriminating.
Typically, scholars focus on the relative size of tournament solutions to justify
these claims. For example, the Banks set is always included in the uncovered
set and this is taken as indicating the superiority of the Banks set to the
uncovered set. However, little attention has been payed to the absolute size
of tournament solutions. In particular, it is important to understand what
the typical size of a given tournament solution is in order to evaluate how
discriminating it is.
Building on initial work by Bell (1981), this question was the focus of
Fey (2008). In that paper, Fey shows that in almost all tournaments, several
standard tournament solutions do not offer any help in discriminating among
alternatives. Specifically, Fey (2008) shows that with probability approaching
one, the top cycle set, the uncovered set, and the Banks set are equal to
the entire set of alternatives in a uniformly chosen large tournament.2 In
1For a comprehensive survey of tournament solutions see Laslier (1997).
2A uniformly chosen tournament is one chosen from the uniform distribution on the
set of all tournaments of a given size. Fey (2008) conjectures that this result would hold
for majority voting tournaments generated by randomly assigning preference orders to a
set of voters.
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other words, these tournament solutions almost never narrow the set of social
choices.
Fey (2008) conjectures that the same result is true for the minimal cover-
ing set. In this paper we confirm that this conjecture holds. That is, we show
that in almost all tournaments, the minimal covering set is the entire set of
alternatives. Thus, in large tournaments, this tournament solution fails to
limit the choice of alternatives at all.
By contrast, we consider the size of the bipartisan set in large tourna-
ments. The bipartisan set is always contained in the minimal covering set
and we draw on existing results in graph theory to show that in large tourna-
ments, the bipartisan set almost always contains close to half the alternatives.
2 Tournaments and Tournament Solutions
Suppose there is a finite set of alternatives, which we denote X. A tournament
T is a complete and asymmetric binary relation on X. Such a tournament can
arise, for example, as the majority preference relation of an odd number of
voters with linear preferences. As is standard, if xTy, then we say that x beats
y. For a subset S ⊆ X, we call T ∩(S×S) the subtournament of T generated
by S.3 For a fixed alternative x ∈ X, let T (x) = {y ∈ X | yTx} denote the
set of alternatives that beat x and let N(x) = {y ∈ X | xTy} denote the set
of alternatives that x beats. For a set Y ⊆ X, we let N(Y ) =
⋃
x∈Y N(x)
denote the set of alternatives that is beaten by some alternative in Y .
A tournament solution is a way of identifying a set of “best” alternatives
from a tournament T . Formally, a tournament solution is a correspondence
that, for every tournament T , selects a nonempty subset of X. A number of
important tournament solutions are based on the covering relation. We say
x covers y if xTy and for all z ∈ X, yTz implies xTz. An alternative x is
3When there is no chance of ambiguity, we use S to refer to both the subtournament
and the set of alternatives on which the subtournament is defined.
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uncovered if there is no y that covers x. The uncovered set of T , UC(T ), is the
set of alternatives that are not covered by any other alterative (Miller, 1980,
1983). For a tournament T and a set S ⊆ X, the uncovered set of S, denoted
UC(S) is the uncovered set of the subtournament of T generated by S. We
say S ⊆ X is a covering set for T if for every x ∈ X \ S, x 6∈ UC(S ∪ {x}).
The set X is trivially a covering set for T and therefore we say S is a proper
covering set for T if S is a covering set for T and S 6= X. Dutta (1988) shows
that there is a covering set for T that is contained in all covering sets for T .
Therefore, for every tournament T , there exists a unique minimal covering
set for T , which we denote MC(T ).
Our result concerns the size of the minimal covering set in a random
tournament. To define the notion of a random tournament, let Tn denote the
set of possible tournaments on n alternatives, n ≥ 3. This set contains 2(
n
2)
distinct tournaments, each of which we take to be equally likely. Equivalently,
a random tournament T ∈ Tn is obtained by choosing independently, for each
pair of alternatives x, y ∈ X, x 6= y, either xTy or yTx with equal probability.
For a random variable Z, we use the notation E[Z] and P[Z = z] for the
expectation of Z and the probability Z takes a value z, respectively.
3 Main Result
Our main result states that the minimal covering set is equal to the entire
set of alternatives in almost all large tournaments. Thus, with probability
approaching one, the minimal covering set is completely undiscriminating
in tournaments with a large number of alternatives. As is standard in the
literature of random graphs (Bollobás, 2001), we say a property Q holds
for almost all tournaments if the probability that a random tournament has
property Q goes to one as the number of alternatives, n, goes to infinity.
Theorem 1. In almost all tournaments, there are no proper covering sets of
T . Therefore, in almost all tournaments, MC(T ) = X.
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Before we prove our main result, we present several lemmas. Our first
lemma records a standard fact that will be useful in the proof of our main
theorem.
Lemma 1. Let Zn be a sequence of random variables that each takes values in
the set of nonnegative integers. If E[Zn]→ 0 as n→∞, then P[Zn = 0]→ 1
as n→∞.




kP[Zn = k] ≥
∞∑
k=1
P[Zn = k] = 1− P[Zn = 0].
It follows that E[Zn]→ 0 implies P[Zn = 0]→ 1.
Our next two lemmas are fairly standard (Moon, 1968), but for com-
pleteness we provide proofs here. Our final lemma is new and may have
some independent interest.
We say a subset S of T is dominating if T = S ∪ N(S), which means
that for every y 6∈ S there is x ∈ S such that xTy. In other words, S is a
dominating set if every alternative outside of S is beaten by some alternative
in S. Trivially, the entire set X is a dominating set and therefore every tour-
nament has a dominating set. We write dom(T ) for the minimum cardinality
of a dominating set. Our first lemma gives a maximum size for dom(T ).
Lemma 2. If |X| = n, then dom(T ) ≤ log2(n + 1).
Proof. Note that the assertion is true for n = 1. We continue by induction.





edges, and so there is
some alternative x with |N(x)| ≥ (n − 1)/2. Let S = T (x) and let R be a
dominating set for S. Then R ∪ {x} is a dominating set for T and therefore
dom(T ) ≤ 1 + dom(S).
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But |S| = n− |N(x)| − 1 ≤ (n− 1)/2 and so by the induction hypothesis,





= log2(n + 1).
Our second lemma gives a minimum size for dom(T ) in almost all tour-
naments.
Lemma 3. Almost all tournaments have dom(T ) > 1
2
log2 n.
Proof. From the definition of dom(T ), it follows that dom(T ) > k if and
only if for every set A ⊆ X with |A| = k there exists an alternative x with
A ⊆ N(x). Define a random variable K to be the number of sets A ⊆ X
with |A| = k in a random tournament such that there is no alternative x with
A ⊆ N(x). Then P[K = 0] is the probability that a random tournament T
has dom(T ) > k.
For a given set A ⊆ X with |A| = k and a given alternative x 6∈ A, the
probability that A ⊆ N(x) in a random tournament is 2−k. Therefore the
probability that there is no x with A ⊂ N(x) is
(1− 2−k)n−k ≤ exp(−(n− k)2−k),
where the right hand side follows from the fact that 1 + z ≤ exp(z) for all







≤ nk exp(−(n− k)2−k)
≤ exp(k log n− (n− k)2−k).
which tends to 0 if k log n − (n − k)2−k → −∞. But it is easy to verify
that this is true if k = d1
2
log ne. Thus, by Lemma 1, P[K = 0] → 1 as
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n→∞.
As is clear from the proof, the constant 1/2 is not optimal (and can be
replaced by any number less than 1).
Our final lemma points out an important connection between covering
sets and dominating sets.
Lemma 4. For a tournament T and a set S ⊆ X, if dom(S) < dom(T ),
then S is not a covering set of T .
Proof. Fix a tournament T and a set S ⊆ X with dom(S) < dom(T ) and
let k = dom(S). Let R ⊆ S be a dominating set of S with |R| = k. We
claim that there exists an alternative x 6∈ S such that xTr for all r ∈ R.
If not, then R is a dominating set for T , which contradicts that assumption
that dom(S) < dom(T ). Thus xTr for all r ∈ R and for all y ∈ S \R, there
exists r ∈ R such that rTy. This means that x ∈ UC(S ∪ {x}), so S is not
a covering set of T .
We are now ready to prove our main result.
Proof of Theorem 1. Define a random variable C to be the number of proper
covering sets of a random tournament. Then P[C = 0] is the probability that
a random tournament has the property that MC(T ) = X. Our argument
will split the set of tournaments of order n into two groups: those that have
a small dominating set, and those that do not. Formally,
P [C > 0] = P
[






























where the last step comes from the trivial bound that a probability is at
most 1. To prove our result, it suffices to show that both of these terms go to
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zero as n goes to infinity. But Lemma 3 implies that this is true for the first
term. So all that remains is to show that P[C > 0 | dom(T ) > (log2 n)/2]
goes to zero as n goes to infinity.
Consider a tournament T with dom(T ) > (log2 n)/2 and n ≥ 4. By
Lemma 4, a set S ⊆ X with dom(S) < dom(T ) is not a covering set, therefore
we need only concern ourselves with subsets S with dom(S) ≥ dom(T ). So
fix such a set S and let x ∈ S be arbitrary. The set T (x) ∩ S must be non-
empty, because otherwise {x} would be a dominating set for S, which would
contradict dom(S) ≥ dom(T ) > (log2 n)/2. So let R be a dominating set for
T (x) ∩ S. Then R ∪ {x} is a dominating set for S and therefore
dom(S) ≤ 1 + dom(T (x) ∩ S)
≤ 1 + log2(|T (x) ∩ S|+ 1).
As dom(S) ≥ dom(T ) > (log2 n)/2, we have
(log2 n)/2 < 1 + log2(|T (x) ∩ S|+ 1)
log2 n
1/2 < log2 2 + log2(|T (x) ∩ S|+ 1)
log2(n
1/2/2) < log2(|T (x) ∩ S|+ 1)
n1/2/2 < |T (x) ∩ S|+ 1.
Thus, |T (x) ∩ S| > n1/2/2− 1, which is at least n1/2/3 for large enough n.
We now turn to calculating P[C > 0 | dom(T ) > (log2 n)/2]. A subset
S can be a proper covering set only if dom(S) ≥ dom(T ). By Lemma 2,
any such set S must have at least
√
n − 1 vertices and, from above, every
alternative x in S must have |T (x) ∩ S| ≥ n1/2/3. Furthermore, if y 6∈ S has
|N(y) ∩ T (x) ∩ S| > 0 then x does not cover y in S ∪ {y}. Let us therefore




(P2) For all x ∈ S, |T (x) ∩ S| ≥ n1/2/3.
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(P3) For all y 6∈ S there is x ∈ S such that |N(y) ∩ T (x) ∩ S| = 0.
Since a covering set S in a tournament T with dom(T ) > (log2 n)/2 must
satisfy all three properties, we have C ′ = C for all such tournaments. So
P[C > 0 | dom(T ) > (log2 n)/2] = P[C ′ > 0 | dom(T ) > (log2 n)/2]
=
P[C ′ > 0 and dom(T ) > (log2 n)/2]
P[dom(T ) > (log2 n)/2]
≤ 2P[C ′ > 0],
since P[dom(T ) > (log2 n)/2] > 1/2 for sufficiently large n by Lemma 3. It
will therefore be sufficient to prove that P[C ′ > 0] → 0 as n → ∞. This is
simpler than dealing with P[C > 0 | dom(T ) > (log2 n)/2] in two ways: the
event C ′ is easier to analyse than C, and we are no longer conditioning on
the size of dom(T ).
Let us first bound E[C ′]. For a fixed set S ⊂ X with n > |S| ≥
√
n− 1,
consider a random tournament T . Then
P[S satisfies (P2) and (P3)]
= P[S satisfies (P3) | S satisfies (P2)]P[S satisfies (P2)]
≤ P[S satisfies (P3) | S satisfies (P2)].
Now suppose S satisfies (P2). For any y 6∈ S and any x ∈ S,
P[|N(y) ∩ T (x) ∩ S| = 0] ≤ 2−n1/2/3.
So for any y ∈ S, the probability that there is x ∈ S such that |N(y)∩T (x)∩
S| = 0 is at most |S|2−n1/2/3. These events are independent for each y 6∈ S,
and so




















































































It is straightforward to show that both of these pieces go to zero as n gets
large. By Lemma 1, this implies that P[C ′ = 0] → 1. We conclude then
that P [C > 0]→ 0 as n gets large and thus almost all tournaments have no
proper covering sets.
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4 The Bipartisan Set
Now that we have established that the minimal covering set is almost always
the entire set of alternatives in large tournaments, it is natural to consider
if this result continues to hold for tournament solutions that are known to
always be contained in the minimal covering set. We address this question
by considering the bipartisan set, due to Laffond et al. (1993).
The bipartisan set is defined in terms of the tournament game of a tour-
nament T . Specifically, for a given tournament T on a set of alternatives X
we associate a two-player zero-sum strategic form game G as follows. We
assign to each player the strategy set X, so that each player’s action is sim-
ply a choice of an alternative from X. If player i chooses alternative x and
player j 6= i chooses alternative y, then the payoff to player i is equal to 1
if xTy, 0 if x = y, and −1 if yTx. Laffond et al. (1993) and Fisher and
Ryan (1992, 1995) independently prove that a tournament game always has
a unique Nash equilibrium. Based on this, Laffond et al. (1993) define the
bipartisan set of T , denoted BP(T ), to be the support of the unique Nash
equilibrium of the tournament game of T . They go on to show that BP(T )
always consists of an odd number of alternatives and that BP(T ) ⊆ MC(T )
for every tournament T .
We now turn to the question of the size of the bipartisan set. Is it almost
always the whole set of alternatives, as with the minimal covering set? It
is easy to see that the answer is negative. Because the bipartisan set must
have an odd number of elements, it follows that BP(T ) 6= X if |X| is even.
So what is the size of the bipartisan set? It turns out that a precise answer
has been given by Fisher and Reeves (1995). They prove that for a random
tournament T ,






2−(n−1) if k is odd
0 if k is even.
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Thus, the size distribution of the bipartisan set is a scaled binomial distri-
bution (with p = 1/2) on the odd integers in {1, . . . , n}. Using this, Fisher
and Reeves show that E[|BP(T )|] = n/2. That is, the average size of the
bipartisan set in a random tournament is n/2. Moreover, it is easy to see
from the size distribution above that the distribution of |BP(T )|/n converges




∣∣∣∣ |BP(T )|n − 12
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε] = 0
for all ε > 0. Another way to put this is that in large tournaments, the size
of the bipartisan set is almost always close to n/2. Therefore, the bipartisan
set turns out be about half the size of the minimal covering set in large
tournaments.
5 Conclusion
This paper confirms a conjecture of Fey (2008) that in almost all tourna-
ments, the minimal covering set is the entire set of alternatives. Thus, we
now know that the top cycle set, the uncovered set, the Banks set and the
minimal covering set are all almost always equal to the entire set of alterna-
tives. On the other hand, the bipartisan set almost always contains close to
half of the alternatives.
Given these results, an obvious open question is to establish the size of
other tournament solutions. For the case of the tournament equilibrium set
(Schwartz, 1990), Brandt et al. (2010) reports on computational experiments
that showed the tournament equilibrium set almost always was the entire set
of alternatives in uniformly chosen large tournaments. This evidence suggests
that our result on the minimal covering set of large tournaments may also
hold for the tournament equilibrium set. We leave this for future work.
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